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THE TREND IN CARRIED INTEREST CASES
Clark W. Breeding*
I. INTRODUCTION
NCOME tax jurisprudence is replete with applications of the
rules that substance should prevail over form and that the federal
tax principles are to be applied so as to achieve a uniform system of
taxation, disregarding the niceties of local law. Yet there is no other
area of federal income tax law in which these principles have been
disregarded so completely as in the taxation of the "carried interest"
arrangements found in the oil and gas industry. As a consequence,
a state of almost hopeless confusion exists with respect to this im-
portant, recurring transaction involving the development of the na-
tion's resources.
Economically, the carried interest arrangement arises in any situa-
tion in which one of two or more owners of a property is willing to
invest his money to develop property and to look for recovery of his
investment solely from the property developed. In other words, one
or more co-owners are willing to expend the funds necessary for
development of the interests of all co-owners and to look only to
the income from the developed property for recovery of their in-
vestment. Generally, the substantive law, which has always en-
couraged the development or exploitation of mineral property, has
protected the developer as against the nonparticipating co-owners.
It has permitted the developer to recover his costs, and in some
situations an even greater amount, before the nonparticipating co-
owners are permitted to share in the income from the property.
However, whether the developing party is entitled to recover his
investment by agreement with the other co-owners, or by operation
of law, is, and should be, immaterial from an income tax standpoint.
From an economic standpoint the co-owner who pays all of the
costs of developing a property and looks only to income from the
property for recovery of his investment may never effect a full
recovery. Consequently, during the recovery period, he should be
regarded as the sole owner of the property, since he is entitled to
receive all production income. The legal methods by which this
economic result is accomplished should be immaterial from a federal
income tax standpoint, since for reasons dictated by state law, or
* C.P.A., Partner, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Dallas, Texas. B.A., Rice University;
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other reasons, the transaction may be cast either in the form of (1)
a nonrecourse loan, (2) a production payment, or (3) a reversionary
interest.
By way of explanation, each of these financial arrangements re-
sults in what is commonly called a "carried interest." The co-owner
who agrees to pay the costs of development is known as the
"carrier," or "carrying party," and the co-owner for whom costs
are advanced is known as the "carried party." To illustrate the three
most typical forms of the arrangement, assume that A and B own
equal shares of an undeveloped property which is a reasonable pros-
pect for development, and that A wants to develop it but B does
not have the money. First, A may agree to lend the money to B but to
look only to the income from the property for repayment of the loan.
This is an example of a nonrecourse loan. Second, A may agree to
develop the property if B will assign to A a production payment that
is payable out of B's interest in the property in an amount equal to B's
proportionate share of the development costs. This is the production
payment form of financing. Third, B may assign his entire interest
in the property to A but reserve a reversionary interest to take effect
after A has recovered the entire costs of development plus costs of
operation. This, obviously, is the reversionary interest method.
In each of the three situations, A must look solely to the developed
property for the recovery of his costs. Thus, the economic result in
every instance is exactly the same. Because of this identity in the
economic realities, the tax consequences should also be similar. How-
ever, the decisions of the courts have not resulted in a uniform tax
treatment of these three forms of the carried interest arrangement.
In 1941, the Revenue Service issued a ruling' dealing with the tax
consequences of a number of transactions involving the oil and gas
industry and, in particular, the principles which it considered ap-
plicable to the carried interest arrangements. The substance of the
ruling, in this regard, was that the carrying party was to be regarded
as the owner of the entire working interest until such time as he
had recovered his costs in full. During that period he was taxable on
all of the production income and was allowed all deductions, in-
cluding depreciation on all equipment costs. When the payout oc-
curred, that is, when he had recovered all of his costs, the carrying
party was required to transfer an appropriate fraction of his de-
preciable basis in the equipment to the cost of the leasehold, since
from that time forward he owned only a portion of the equipment.
'G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 214.
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The transferred cost was then recoverable only out of depletion. The
carried party was not, however, allowed a deduction for depreciation
of his portion of the equipment, before or after payout, since
he had no investment in the equipment, that is, his basis was zero.
The views expressed in this ruling were sustained by the Tax
Court in 1947 in the Manahan' case in which a reversionary working
interest was involved, but before that time, the court had decided
the Abercrombie3 and the Herndon4 cases on different theories. These
three cases were landmark decisions which for many years established
a rather confused direction to the tax treatment of carried interest
arrangements. An analysis of these cases, as well as those which have
been decided in more recent years, may, however, forecast a trend
which will enable practitioners to determine with more certainty the
tax consequences of carried interest transactions.
II. ECONOMIC INTEREST
Before considering the carried interest cases, it may be desirable
to review briefly the concept of "economic interest" in natural
resources. In general, the owner of an "economic interest" in an oil
and gas property is the person who is taxed upon the income pro-
duced and is allowed deductions for the expenses, including depletion,
incurred in producing such income. The regulations define an "eco-
nomic interest" as that interest which "is possessed in every case in
which the taxpayer has acquired by investment any interest in
mineral in place . . . and secures, by any form of legal relationship,
income derived from the extraction of the mineral . . . to which he
must look for a return of his capital."' There are two aspects of
this definition which are particularly significant in a consideration
of the carried interest cases: the first concerns the phrase "interest in
mineral in place," and the second involves the phrase "income de-
'Manahan Oil Co., 8 T.C. 1159 (1947).
'Commissioner v. J. S. Abercrombie Co., 162 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1947).4 Herndon Drilling Co., 6 T.C. 628 (1946), acq. and nonacq. on other issues, 1946-2
Cum. Bull. 3, 6. The nonacquiescence of the Commissioner to this decision maintains that
legal verbiage alone cannot create two properties, to wit, a working interest and a production
payment, out of one property when the conveyance is made simultaneously to a single
assignee. If the Commissioner's view were to be sustained, the Herndon case would follow
the Manahan case. It may not be significant that the Fifth Circuit in Sowell v. Commis-
sioner, 302 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1962), contrasts the Herndon and Manahan rules with the
Abercrombie rule since the "carried party" involved in the Sowell case was treated the
same as in both Herndon and Manahan. However, note Judge Wisdom's dissent in Floyd
v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1962), in which he would have held that reservation
of an overriding royalty and a concurrent production payment created two separate property
interests even though arising simultaneously in a single transaction.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (1960).
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rived from the extraction of the mineral.., to which he must look
for a return of his capital."
Concerning the first, it seems abundantly clear that the taxpayer
need not own legal title to the oil and gas in place A right to share
in the minerals produced constitutes an interest in the minerals in
place for federal tax purposes, even though legal title to the minerals
is vested by state law in another person.7 A right to share in the
proceeds from disposition of the minerals has also been held' to
represent an interest in the minerals in place, even if such share is
reduced by costs of production
With respect to the second phrase, it is clearly established that a
taxpayer does not possess an economic interest for federal tax pur-
poses if he can look to anything except a share of production for
recovery of the investment. In the leading case of Anderson v.
Helvering,° the assignor of some properties received cash plus a
right to additional sums payable out of production from the property
and out of proceeds from the sale of the property. The Supreme
Court held that the assignor's interest was not an economic interest
subject to depletion, since he might receive a portion of his recovery
from the sale of the property."
A great deal more could be said about these two fundamental
principles, but this brief discussion is sufficient to provide an orien-
tation for the evaluation of the various carried interest cases.
III. CARRIED INTEREST CASES
A. Manahan Oil Co."2
Although the Manahan case was not the first of what may be
called the guideline cases in the carried interest area, it probably
deserves first mention because it affirmed the administrative policy
of the Internal Revenue Service pronounced in 1941." That position
is still followed by the Service and was even incorporated in principle
in the present proposed regulations under the 1954 Code.14
In this case, the taxpayer, as an assignee, acquired a one-half work-
ing interest in various leases for a cash consideration plus an agree-
' See Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
7 Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
'Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
'See Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
'0 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
"Id. at 413.
128 T.C. 1159 (1947).
1 See G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 214, discussed in text accompanying note I
supra.
4 See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (2), 25 Fed. Reg. 3761 (1960).
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ment to drill and complete one well. If additional wells were re-
quired, the taxpayer was to drill and complete them also, but the
assignor agreed to assign to the taxpayer an additional one-fourth
of the working interest until such time as the taxpayer had recovered,
from the net proceeds from total production, the entire amount of
the development costs, including costs of the first well, and an
amount equal to the cash consideration paid for the one-half inter-
est. After recovery of such sum, the taxpayer's interest in one-fourth
of the production was to terminate, and the assignor and taxpayer
were then each to own one-half of the working interest. The tax-
payer was to have sole control of the development and operation of
the properties at all times.
The question presented for the court's consideration was whether
the taxpayer should be taxable on the income attributable to the
assigned one-fourth interest. The taxpayer argued that the income
should be taxable to the assignor, since the taxpayer had received
those proceeds only as reimbursement of the assignor's costs. The
court held, however, that the income was taxable to the taxpayer.
The fact that he held the one-fourth interest for only a limited period
of time did not disturb the court. "The assignors did not receive the
income in question either actually or constructively.""
B. Herndon Drilling Co.1"
Slightly more than a year before the decision in the Manahan case,
the Tax Court decided the Herndon case. Here the taxpayer was a
drilling contractor who entered into a contract for the drilling of
wells on two leases. Under the terms of the contract, the taxpayer
received an undivided one-half share of the working interest in each
of the leases. Simultaneously, with the conveyance of the working
interest, the assignor assigned the remaining one-half interest in the
leases in the form of an absolute conveyance, but this conveyance
was made pursuant to the terms of a contract which provided that
"said assignment [is] to be in the nature of a mortgage to secure
contractor against the cost and expense advanced by contractor
hereunder for the account of owners."1 Provisions were made for
reassignment of the assignor's remaining one-half interest after the
recovery of specified costs by the assignee. The contract provided
that the assignors were to have no personal liability for amounts
advanced by the assignee to develop the leases. However, the assignors
'°8 T.C. at 1162.




did have the right at any time to pay in cash the unrecovered portion
of the advances made by the taxpayer and thereby secure a reassign-
ment of the undivided interests previously conveyed in the form of
a mortgage.
In this case, as in the Manahan case, the taxpayer argued that the
income accruing to the interest assigned for a limited period of time
represented only the repayment of a loan. The Commissioner con-
tended that all of the income accruing to the taxpayer's permanent
interest, as well as the income accruing to the temporarily assigned
interest, was taxable to the taxpayer. In addition, the Commissioner
argued that the two interests merely represented a single property
for purposes of computing depletion. The court agreed with the
Commissioner only in part. Although agreeing that the assignee had
to report all of the income during the payout period, the court held
that the taxpayer did have two separate depletable interests; one was
represented by the permanent working interest, the other by the oil
payment interest.
It is interesting to note that in the Manahan case, decided only a
year after the Herndon case, the court made no reference to Herndon.
Yet, the economic circumstances of the taxpayers in both cases were
almost identical, in that the taxpayer in both cases acquired an
interest in a lease and, as a part of the consideration given, agreed
to drill and equip one or more wells on the property. The costs
incurred on behalf of the assignors were to be recovered by the as-
signees solely from production from the properties. In both cases,
the assignors' interests were conveyed to the assignees with pro-
visions for a reconveyance after recovery by the assignees of specified
costs. The only difference between the two appears to be that in the
Herndon case, there was an express contractual provision that the
conveyance was to be in the nature of a mortgage to secure the
assignee against costs and expenses advanced by him on behalf of
the assignor. However, the court in its analysis dismissed the effect
of the mortgage language of the contract as not controlling in de-
termining whether a loan was made. The two cases are consistent in
that they tax to an assignee, all of the income accruing to both the
permanently and temporarily assigned interests. They are incon-
sistent in that Herndon treats the temporarily assigned interest as
a production payment; whereas, Manahan treats the temporarily
assigned interest as a working interest. The consequences of this in-
consistency affect principally the computation of percentage deple-
tion, since the separate properties theory of Herndon causes separate
depletion computations to be made for each property.
1963 ]
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The Internal Revenue Service has never agreed with the two
property concepts of the Herndon decision. It argued in that case,
and still maintains as a matter of administrative policy, that the
assignee in the Herndon type situation does not have two separate
properties but has a temporarily enlarged working interest. If the
position of the Revenue Service is ultimately sustained, there will
be no difference in the depletion computation under either the
Manahan or Herndon theories.
C. Commissioner v. J. S. Abercrombie Co.'8
This case was decided in point of time between the Herndon and
Manahan decisions. Simplifying the facts somewhat, A and B were
co-owners of producing oil and gas properties. A assigned his inter-
est to B for a cash consideration but reserved an oil payment and a
one-sixteenth carried working interest. A had no personal obligation
to reimburse the assignee for any portion of the operating costs, but
unliquidated expenses incurred by the assignee were to be carried
forward and charged against future receipts accruing to the benefit
of the reserved carried interest.
The taxpayer, B, excluded from his income the income and ex-
penditures attributable to A's one-sixteenth carried interest. The
Commissioner determined that B should have reported the income
and deductions in the year before payout occurred as his income
and expense. However, the Fifth Circuit held that A's one-sixteenth
working interest was a capital investment in the oil property; there-
fore, the income was not includable in B's income since it was tax-
able directly to the owner of the capital investment which had
produced it."0
The economic consequences of the arrangement in the Abercrombie
case were identical with those in the Herndon and Manahan cases,
that is, the carrying party received the full proceeds from produc-
tion until all costs had been recouped, at which time some form
of reversionary interest in the carried party took effect. However,
it is apparent that the Abercrombie court reached a substantially
different tax result. The only distinction between the latter case and
the other two, and this distinction seems more formal than real, is
that in Abercrombie the assignor retained or held title to the working
interest; whereas, the arrangement was accomplished in the other two
cases by a temporary assignment of title. If the federal tax laws are
to depend upon the substance of transactions rather than their form,




it does not appear that a different result should have been reached
in Abercrombie.
It should be noted that the carried interest arrangement in the
Abercrombie case was a so-called "perpetual carried interest." In
other words, A was to be carried for the entire producing life of the
property. If payout occurred and A received remittances attributable
to his one-sixteenth interest, he was not required to account to B
for such remittances in the event that expenses later exceeded income.
However, if, after payout, the expenses did exceed the income, such
expenses were to be recouped from later production before A would
be entitled to further remittances from the property. Under no
circumstances could A have been obligated to come forward with
his portion of the expenses during the deficit period. This result does
differ from that obtained in the Manahan and Herndon cases, be-
cause in those cases after initial payout occurred, the assignors re-
ceived a reassignment of their working interest in the property and
were subsequently required to come forward with their proportionate
shares of operating expenses. The Revenue Service takes the position
that a perpetual carried interest arrangement is nothing more than
a net profits interest, which is treated for tax purposes as an over-
riding royalty." The principal consequences of such a conclusion are
the effect upon the computation of depletion on the income from
the working interest, with its larger gross income figure, and from
the net profits interest, with its absence of an expense burden, and
the determination of the character of income received upon assign-
ment of the working interest subject to a retained net profits interest.
D. Prater v. Commissioner"
The taxpayer, Prater, and two other individuals each took un-
divided interests in oil and gas properties. Capital for development
was provided by the other venturers who pledged the properties as
security. The taxpayer was not to be liable personally for any of
the development costs nor for the loans made to provide funds for
such costs, but the production from the property attributable to
Prater's interest was to be charged with his portion of such costs.
On his tax returns Prater deducted his proportionate share of the
losses. The Commissioner disallowed the claimed deductions on the
ground that all losses were attributable to the carrying party. In
Abercrombie, the court had merely decided that the income was not
taxable to the carrying party and did not determine when expenses
'0 See Breeding & Burton, Taxation of Oil and Gas Income § 6.04 (1961).
" 273 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1959).
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could be deducted by the carried party. In Prater, on the other hand,
the court was dealing with the deductibility of expenses by the
carried party. It will be observed that the taxpayer here was arguing
the application of the Abercrombie theory, although the Commis-
sioner, before the Tax Court, argued for the application of the
Manahan theory. Nevertheless, on appeal the Commissioner aban-
doned this distinction and sought to disallow deduction of the ex-
penses on the ground that they were not "paid or incurred,"2 since
the requirement to pay would never exist until income from the
property exceeded all of the corresponding expenses. The Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected this argument and allowed deduction of the expenses or
losses because they were charged upon and resulted in a diminution
of value of Prater's interest in the property. A strong dissent by
Judge Wisdom indicated that he would overrule Abercrombie, if
necessary, to reach the result that a loan or pledge is not equivalent
to payment when there is no personal obligation to repay and when
the property has no value. Consequently, under Prater the carried
party is entitled to a deduction for losses when costs exceed income
during the payout period. However, during this same period the
carried party is not required to report the income, according to
Herndon and Manahan, unless there is a capital investment as found
in Abercrombie.
E. Wood v. Commissioner23
Prior to divorce, Mr. and Mrs. Wood owned, as community prop-
erty, a forty-five per cent interest in certain oil and gas leases. At
the time of the divorce, there were certain community debts. The
divorce decree awarded Mrs. Wood a one-half interest in this
property "after the payment of community debts." 4 The court
found that Texas law recognized that, after divorce, the wife was
not personally liable for the payment of community debts. More-
over, in an action to construe the divorce decree, the state court
had previously held that Mrs. Wood had only a reversionary interest
in the mineral properties. The court of appeals held that since Mrs.
Wood had no title to the property and the debts were not her per-
sonal debts, she had no income from the property during the years
in question. The economic effect of the situation is that a carried
interest has actually arisen by operation of law. Although the de-
cision of the majority made no reference to any of the carried inter-
est cases, the decision follows the principles of the Manahan case
1Id. at 126.
23 274 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1960).
24 Id. at 269.
[Vol. 17
CARRIED INTEREST TRENDS
rather than the Abercrombie or Prater cases to the effect that the
carrying party, and not the carried party, is taxed on the income
during the payout period.
F. Estate Of Weinert v. Commissioner2 5
Weinert owned an interest in unitized oil and gas properties. He
assigned one-half of his interest, plus a production payment of
50,000 dollars payable out of his retained half interest, to Lehman
in consideration of Lehman's payment of 100,000 dollars in cash and
agreement to advance up to 150,000 dollars of Weinert's share of
the costs of development and the costs of a projected processing
plant. These advances were to be recovered by Lehman only out
of net profit accruing to Weinert's interest, and the assigned pro-
duction payment was to take effect and to be payable to Lehman
only after recovery of the 150,000 dollars in advances. Although
Weinert was not relieved of his obligation to third parties under
the unitization agreement, he had no personal liability with respect
to the advances made by Lehman. Weinert assigned his interest
to a trustee with directions to pay the net profits over to Lehman
until Lehman had recovered his advances and the production pay-
ment, after which the trustee and Lehman were to reassign the
interest to Weinert. During the years in question, the net profits had
been applied to recovery of the advances, and none had been applied
to the production payment.
Even though no notes or other evidence of indebtedness were sign-
ed, there was an agreement called a "loan agreement."" On the
basis of all the circumstances, the Tax Court concluded that the ar-
rangement was nothing other than a loan arrangement and held that
the income was taxable to Weinert." The result of such a holding
is, of course, logically consistent with the Abercrombie case, that is,
the income was taxable to the carried party. However, the Tax
Court did not rely upon Abercrombie. In any event, the holding was
in conflict with the prior holdings in Herndon and Manahan.
In what is probably the most carefully considered and exhaustively
reasoned decision on the subject, the Fifth Circuit reversed the de-
cision of the Tax Court and held that Weinert was not taxable on
the income during the payout period. The court first pointed out
that substance rather than form must control the incidence of tax-
25294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1960).
21Id. at 753.
2' Estate of Weinert, 31 T.C. 918 (1959).
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ation. Then, relying upon Palmer v. Bender,"8 and the Kirby,29 Burton-
Sutton,"' and Southwest Exploration Co.3' cases, the court pointed
out that economic interest, rather than legal title, determines the
substance of oil and gas transactions. Despite references to a loan
agreement and to Lehman's "loans and advances," the court held that
the transaction did not constitute a loan, first, because the parties had
not treated it as a loan, and second, because it did not have the at-
tributes of a conventional loan or mortgage transaction. The court's
reasoning up to this point suggested the possibility that the court
might overrule Abercrombie and Prater, but rather than doing that,
the court distinguished the two decisions on the ground that in each
of them the taxpayers had retained title to the interest out of which
the carried expenses were paid. In the instant case, Weinert did not
retain title, although he did not assign it to Lehman, because title
could have been recovered from the trustee only after payout and
only then with Lehman's concurrence. The court analogized the
transaction to the Manahan, or Herndon, type arrangement which,
it stated, had the same tax consequences.
In either type of arrangement, as in the Weinert-Lehman transaction,
the vital point is that the development burden is redistributed and the
production income is reallocated: the particular production income in
question is diverted from one owner of the operating interest to another
in exchange for contributions dedicated and used to developing the
property. Since the carried interest and the production payment are
required for development, the effect of either transaction is to establish
such a direct relation of the risk capital to the minerals as to qualify the
carried interest or carved out production share as an economic interest
to the oil and gas in place."2
The court concluded:
During the term of the carry (or the production payment) Lehman
received the full economic value incident to the mineral interest in
the leases; Lehman, not Weinert, was taxable therefore on all of the
production attributable to the interest in the leasehold. The effect of
our holding is to gear income to receipts and deductions to expendi-
tures.
33
Thus, the swing was made back to the principles of Manahan and
Herndon.
28287 U.S. 551 (1933).
2
' Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
"°Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v, Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
" Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
32 294 F.2d at 761.
3 Id. at 762-63.
[Vol. 17
CARRIED INTEREST TRENDS
G. Sowell v. Commissioner34
The Sowell case is not strictly a carried interest case, but the
economic result is the same. Here, the taxpayer placed full legal title
to the working interest in a producing property in a nominee. Banks,
relying upon the recorded title, loaned money to the nominee on
his personal account, accepting as collateral a mortgage on the entire
property. Under state law the taxpayer was estopped to deny the
validity of the mortgage." The Commissioner sought to exclude
from taxpayer's return the income from the property and, thus, the
corresponding depletion deduction, and in addition to deny the tax-
payer a deduction for the bad debt uncollectible from the fraudulent
nominee. The Tax Court upheld the determination of the Com-
missioner. The Fifth Circuit reversed, allowing the loss deduction
and also holding that since the nominee's action could not be de-
nied by his principals, the taxpayers had, in effect, placed a mortgage
on the property and that such a transaction did not divest them of
an economic interest in the production. Income was, therefore,
realized by the taxpayer each month as the assigned oil runs paid
off the indebtedness. Hence, the corresponding depletion deduction
was allowed. Debt was thus distinguished from a conveyance. How-
ever, the taxpayer was a carried party, and according to the Weinert,
Wood, Herndon, and Manahan cases, he should not have had taxable
income. Yet, the case is consistent with Abercrombie and Prater.
IV. PROPOSED REGULATIONS AND CARRIED INTERESTS
The regulations have never dealt specifically with the treatment
of carried interest arrangements. On the other hand, the regula-
tions dealing with the deductibility of intangible drilling costs-
both those promulgated under the 1939 Code and those proposed
under the 1954 Code-do have an important bearing upon the tax
consequences of the carried interest transactions.
The regulations under the 1939 Code"s provided that a taxpayer
who properly elected to expense intangible drilling costs and who
drilled one or more oil wells in exchange for an interest in a lease
could deduct only that portion of the intangible drilling costs
attributable to his interest. In other words, if the taxpayer drilled
34 302 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1962). J. Wisdom starts his opinion by saying: "This is a
man-bites-dog case. Here, taxpayers-not disinterestedly, of course-contend that they
received income. The Commissioner denies that they did."
"See National Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Davis, 60 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Comm. App.
1933); Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Netterville, 110 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937),
rev'd on other grounds, 134 Tex. 30, 132 S.W.2d 93 (1939).
"
6 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (m)-16(a) (1), 18 Fed. Reg. 5840 (1953).
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a well for a seventy-five per cent interest in a lease, he could deduct
only seventy-five per cent of the intangible drilling cost. It was
under these, or comparable prior regulations, that the Revenue Service
policy regarding the treatment of carried interest transactions was
developed. It was recognized that in the typical carried interest ar-
rangement, the taxpayer did not own all of the interest in the prop-
erty throughout its productive life, and it was necessary to consider
whether this regulation would cause some restriction on the deducti-
bility of intangible drilling costs incurred by the carrying party.
Thus, it was necessary to determine whether a taxpayer who drilled
one or more wells in exchange for the entire interest in a property
until payout and thereafter retained only a seventy-five per cent
interest should be entitled to a deduction for the entire intangible
drilling cost. The Service concluded from the regulations that all
of the intangibles should be allowed to the carrying party on the
ground that at the time of the agreement, there was no certainty
that payout would occur, and therefore, the carrying party might
be the owner of the property for its entire productive life.
Instances occurred in which taxpayers tried to circumvent the
general provision of the regulations by creating carried interest ar-
rangements under which the cost to be recovered represented only
a limited portion of the total cost of drilling and completing a well.
To the extent that payout was measured by only a limited portion
of the cost of the well, the underlying theory justifying full allow-
ance of the deductions on carried interest arrangements became less
sound. As a consequence, the administrative policy permitted de-
duction of the entire intangible drilling cost by the carrying party
only if all of such costs were to be recovered before the carried party
received an interest in production.
The deductibility of intangible drilling costs was not covered by
statute until 1954. In the 1954 Code, Congress specifically directed
the Commissioner to adopt regulations comparable to those in effect
under the 1939 Code. 7
Despite the apparent simplicity and directness of this statutory
provision, the Revenue Service has had a great deal of difficulty in
promulgating regulations. This is evidenced by the fact that the
first proposed regulations released in 1956'3 were withdrawn, and
new regulations proposed in 1960.39 Final regulations still have not
been promulgated.
37 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 263 (c).
"Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4, 21 Fed. Reg. 8446 (1956).
39See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4, 25 Fed. Reg. 3761 (1960).
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One of the factors which appears to be causing the difficulty is the
effort on the part of the Revenue Service to incorporate in these
regulations an application of the Manahan theory as developed in
connection with the administrative practice described above. The
present proposed regulations provide that a person holding all, or a
fraction, of the operating rights in an oil and gas property for the
"complete payout period," may, at his option, deduct intangible
drilling costs paid or incurred by him to the extent that such costs
are attributable to his interest in the property. The complete payout
period is defined as "the period ending when the gross income at-
tributable to all of the operating mineral interests in the well (or
wells) equals all expenditures for drilling and development (tangible
and intangible) of such well (or wells) plus the costs of operating
such well (or wells) to produce such an amount."" Since it is not
necessary, under the proposed regulations, to have legal title to the
property in order to hold all of the operating rights, the proposed
rule would have exactly the same effect as the Manahan case. Some
question has been raised as to the validity of the proposed rule, in
view of the fact that the previous regulations did not contain a
similar provision. However, the Revenue Service justifies the change
on the ground that it is consistent with prior administrative practice.
The proposed regulations also provide that if a person holds all
or a fraction of the operating rights for less than the complete pay-
out period, he may deduct only those costs which are attributable to
his share of such interest immediately after complete payout. Thus,
if A assigned a lease to B with a provision that a fifty per cent inter-
est in that lease should revert to A after B had recovered fifty per cent
of the cost of drilling and equipping a well, B would be entitled to
deduct only fifty per cent of the intangible drilling costs."'
Although several criticisms may be leveled at the proposed regula-
tions, it is not within the scope of this Article to consider such
matters. It is sufficient for present purposes to indicate that the
Revenue Service still favors the Manahan approach to the carried
interest problem.
V. CONCLUSION
The tax consequences of any arrangement involving the sharing
of the risks of exploration, development, and operation of a mineral
property must be resolved by economic substance. It is well estab-
lished that the owner of an economic interest in a mineral property
' Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (2), 25 Fed. Reg. 3761 (1960).
"Proposed Treas. Reg. S 1.612-4(a) (3), 25 Fed. Reg. 3761 (1960).
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is taxed on the income from that property and entitled to the ac-
companying depletion allowances.42 An economic interest in the
property contemplates an investment in the minerals in place which,
through any legal relationship, entitles its owner to a right to return
of his investment exclusively through the extraction of such mineral.
Inasmuch as the carried interest is defined as "an arrangement
between two or more co-owners of a working interest, whereby one
agrees to advance all or some part of the development costs on behalf
of the others and to recover such advances from future production,
if any, accruing to the other owners' share of the working interest," 3
it follows that an economic interest exists in the property because
both parties have "made an investment in the minerals in place"
and look solely to "the extraction of minerals" for the return of
that investment." The carrying party-the owner who advances
the funds-is the one upon whom the burden of development falls
and to whom the production normally flows. The carried party-the
one for whom the funds are advanced-is looking to the extraction
of minerals for the return of any capital he has previously invested.
In a sense, both have an economic interest in the property. The
carrying party has a present interest, and the carried party has an
interest from which he hopes to realize income in the future.
Emerging from the web spun by the cases on the subject are the
boundaries by which we may test the presence of an economic inter-
est. Whenever the legal language used is that of conveyance, and the
assignee cannot look to any other collateral for recoupment of his
investment, the result is the transfer of an economic interest together
with the inherent right to income and depletion. 5 On the other
hand, when the assignee may look to a personal obligation or to other
collateral from which to recover his investment, the result is a debt,
and the economic interest has not shifted."
Many fact situations lie between these two extremes. Perhaps the
most irksome situation involves the use of "subject-to" indebtedness.
Abstractly, it may be said that one who invests in a mortgage on
oil property behind which there is no personal liability to repay or
other collateral must necessarily look solely to the production from
the property to recoup his investment. This very result implies that
42See Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
' Breeding & Burton, op. cit. supra note 20, at § 2.08.
44 See Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1 (b) (1) (1960); text accompanying note 5 supra.45 See Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958), holding that even with
an abundance of certainty as to payout, the owner of the minerals parted with production
and did not make a loan when the form of the transaction was conveyance of an interest
in the property.
"Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
[Vol. 17
CARRIED INTEREST TRENDS
an economic interest has been created. Yet, the cases indicate a closer
look is required.47 The test applied is one of substance. Does the in-
vestor in the "subject-to" mortgage have a reasonable expectancy
of recovery of his investment as a normal lender, or has he made
the investment with the primary intent to participate in the profits
arising from the development of a speculative property acquired
simultaneously? If profit through risk enters into the transaction, an
economic interest has shifted.
The carried interest is frequently created through a conveyance
of a property interest with a reversion of a portion of that interest
to the "carried party" so that the form of the transaction shifts legal
ownership. In some instances, a "carried interest" is framed in the
language of a mortgage with no personal liability assumed or addi-
tional collateral posted by the "carried party," thus causing the
"carrying party" to look solely to a participation in the profits for
the recoupment of his investment. In this latter situation, there is
an assumption of risk by the "carrying party" far above that under-
taken by a normal lender of money. It may be stated, then, that
when the arrangement is a carried interest, the economic interest,
together with the inherent right to income and depletion, has shifted
to the "carrying party."
"'Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), is the landmark decision cited or dis-
tinguished by many courts in "carried interest" arrangements framed in the language of
a mortgage. This case held that income and depreciation attributable to inherited improved
real estate against which "subject-to" indebtedness existed was properly a part of the basis
computation in determining gain upon sale of the property. The holder of the "subject-to"
indebtedness in this case was a financial institution routinely engaged in the business of
lending money. Contrasted with this situation are the myriad of cases of loans by corpora-
tions to stockholders and by individuals to relatives in which the form of the transaction
is ignored by the courts as they seek to determine the intent of the parties and the likelihood
of repayment in view of all the circumstances surrounding the transactions.
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